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Unholy
ORDERS
'New world order': the Left's three favourite hate words of 
the year. But Diarmuid Maguire suggests righteous 
indignation isn't enough. A sober look at the new global 
realities is in order.
he New World Order' threatens to be­
come as pervasive a slogan as "Drink 
Coca Cola". It has entered our homes 
through the electronic media; it turns 
up in our daily newspapers; and entire conferen­
ces are organised around the meaning of the con­
cept Indeed, one wouldn't be surprised to come 
across it on a trip to a remote village somewhere. 
Whenever I hear or read the phrase I imagine that 
a Saddam-like portrait of George Bush has been 
erected in my living room or on a billboard on my 
way to work. And my immediate urge is to pencil 
in a funny moustache and a pair of round glasses.
It is dear that I am not alone. There are a host of subversive 
scribblers who insert in their artides a "dis" before the 
"order" or substitute "American" for "world". "Fight the 
New World Order!" screams a poster near my local railway 
station. This shows that some are prepared to challenge the 
concept head on. But the contested slogan survives even 
here. One wonders if such a campaign - like "Don't Drink 
Coca Cola!" - can ultimately be successful.
I must admit that there is a dark part of me that cheers 
every time there is some terrible international news, I 
know that this news chips away at the New American 
Order and illustrates the true character of our New World 
Disorder. In this regard - to paraphrase John Lennon -1 
know I'm not the only one. But again, like Lennon, I would
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much prefer to imagine a world that was better and explore 
positive ways to help build it.
So what is The New World Order' exactly, and what are 
we supposed to do with it? For it isn't good enough to draw 
funny moustaches or issue open challenges without know­
ing what one wants to subvert, fight or replace. It seems 
that at least three meanings have been attached to the 
slogan and it is useful to examine each in turn.
New World Order One characterises an international sys­
tem that has supposedly become more stable and secure 
because of the end of the Cold War. From this viewpoint, 
the evaporation of the East-West equation and greater 
US-Soviet cooperation will reduce the nuclear threat and 
lead to the resolution of regional conflicts. Although this 
version of the New World Ord er received a body blow with 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it was quickly reconstituted in 
the wake of the US victory over Iraq.
New World Order Two stems from the notion that the 
collapse of Soviet power represents the ultimate and global 
triumph of capitalist democracy. This thesis has been ar­
gued forcefully by Francis Fukuyama in his 'End of 
History' articles. It is an argument that has been criticised 
by those who see History's virulent return with the resur­
rection of ancient quarrels in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Regardless, it is clear that the marxist-leninist 
model of economic and political development has col­
lapsed and that the alternative of capitalist democracy has 
been used to fill the vacuum. In this manifestation of world 
politics in transition, peace and cooperation will be estab­
lished among states that need trade and investment and 
whose militaries will be subject to 'the democratic veto'.
Finally, New World Order Three condenses the previous 
two, but expresses them in concrete politico-strategic 
terms. That is, the US won the Cold War and it is the US 
that will shape the post-Cold War world. In this version, 
America will be the cautious leader of a unipolar world in 
which it shares not only power, but also the economic 
burden of hegemony. In return, it will help guarantee the 
survival of capitalism and democracy and will provide a 
modicum of international stability.
All three world orders represent an attempt to envisage a 
replacement for an old international system that no longer 
exists. The Cold War Order has gone and it has left a 
vacuum in international politics. Old power structures and 
ideologies are being sloughed off painfully and slowly. 
Leaders are searching for principles and institutions 
around which to organise a new system. The post-Cold 
War era is still pre-Something Else, and slogans like The 
New World Order' hide the fact that nobody knows what 
that 'Something' will be. Will international politics in fu­
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ture be shaped by cooperative security alliances, the 
'natural' harmony of capitalist democracy, or the continu­
ing dominance of the United States?
New World Order One: Saddam Hussein's invasion of 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990 not only challenged New World 
Order One, but also illustrated what superpower clients 
might do if freed from Cold War constraints. The degenera­
tion of the international system into a Hobbesian 'war of 
all against all' was something that the US and the Soviets 
were determined to prevent Bush's repeated references to 
the collapse of global order in the 1920s and 1930s, and his 
comparison of Saddam with Hitler, revealed this deep- 
seated fear. The US administration also sought to use the 
Gulf War as a means of forging new security arrangements 
through coalition building and burden sharing among 
capitalist democracies — old, new and potential.
In the short-term, the coalition was a success. In the long­
term, however, no structures have been established to 
fight, let alone prevent such wars in future. The United 
Nations merely sanctioned the use of force by the US-led 
alliance and thus was not strengthened as an international 
security organisation. NATO was not involved and still 
resists the idea of military engagement outside Europe. 
The organisation that was established, in the words of one 
of its architects to "keep the Soviets out, the Americans in 
and the Germans down", no longer has a rationale for 
existing. The European Community lacks the military ap­
paratus to guarantee 'order' internally or externally. This 
can be seen by the failure of its monitors in attempting to 
impose a ceasefire in Yugoslavia by carrying little more 
than EC flags.
All the Gulf War demonstrated was that an international 
coalition can be established if conflict breaks out in a a vital 
strategic and economic region. But the tremendous effort 
that went into defeating such a small nation cannot be 
exerted repeatedly. Thus the Kurds and the Shi'ites have 
been subjected to renewed Iraqi attacks and receive little 
more than rhetorical support Yugoslavia is left to pursue 
its own civil war which has already claimed more casual­
ties than those borne by the allies in the Gulf.
The greatest challenge to New World Order One comes 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There, old elites 
in new guises struggle to preserve their power and some 
are willing to shed blood in order to do so. Conflicts are 
becoming more fierce in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Ukraine and the central Asian republics. But there are no 
international frameworks for resolving them, or even dam­
pening their effects.
It is unclear how the New World Order can maintain 
international security when these conflicts spill across na­
tional boundaries and challenge their very existence. 
Under these circumstances, the Bush administration is 
forced to sit back and observe these events like the rest of 
us. This explains its caution in recognising various inde­
pendence movements. If a large and important part of the 
world is deprived of legitimate national boundaries, there
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can be no international stability and order for the foresee- 
able future.
New World Order TWo: Perhaps these problems might be 
resolved as the free market and representative democracy 
slowly encourage individuals to pursue more material 
gains and to settle their differences peacefully. This is the 
solution advanced by the advocates of New World Order 
Two. They argue that the end of the Cold War shows that 
capitalist democracy is the only viable way to manage a 
political and economic system. Thus the problems of post- 
communist regimes can be sol ved by their societies absorb­
ing the short-term pain of market transition and fully 
accepting representative democracy. It has been claimed 
that countries like Poland have already moved well along 
this path.
Yet this analysis of the post-communist world fails to 
recognise how old elites there are engaged in a struggle to 
effect control of the means of production and existing state 
structures. Democratic centralisers want to maintain the 
nation-state but transform its institutions. Authoritarian 
centralisers work to keep the nation-state and existing 
institutions intact. And regional ethnocrats — whether 
authoritarian or democratic — are prepared to encourage 
ethnic conflict in order to challenge present boundaries. 
But all are capable of accepting the market and the trap­
pings of democracy if it helps them realise their goals. In 
this way, after the transition to capitalist democracy, the 
same people remain in charge but, as the Poles say, they 
now wear different hats. Often their power is legitimated 
by free elections. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, elections 
allow the ruled in Eastern Europe to hear their new chains 
rattle.
The post-Cold War era is 
still pre-Something Else
Like most of Latin America, much of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union is now formally democratic. But also like 
Latin America, this democracy is a thin electoral veneer 
that covers highly elitist power structures. The pre-coup 
Soviet Union was managed by an unelected Soviet Presi­
dent who ruled by decree. The post-coup Soviet Union is 
run by Russia's first elected president, who nonetheless 
prefers the same method of control.
The argument that the marriage of capitalism and 
democracy will produce 'order' in the East also ignores 
important lessons from history. It is no easy task to absorb 
the social costs of the market and maintain political 
democracy simultaneously. Italy, Germany and Spain dis­
covered this in the interwar years. The birth of new 
capitalist democracies in the international system is no 
guarantee of future stability and order.
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New World Order Three: Given the limitations of the first 
two alternatives, is the United States the only power 
capable of promoting international stability? The US is a 
representative democracy and it has the world's largest 
capitalist economy and military machine. It has no real 
challengers in the international system, and even powerful 
economic actors like Germany and Japan are prepared to 
follow its political lead. It has even been argued that the 
US governs a unipolar world and that this will be the case 
for some time to come.
But the US isn't running the world at the moment. Nobody 
is. It's just that the US reaction to a particular world event 
is much more important than that of anyone else. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait provided it with a rare opportunity to 
exercise its power successfully. The strategic importance of 
the region, the brutal nature of the aggression and the lack 
of a skilled opponent weighed the odds heavily in 
America's favour. This combination is unlikely to occur 
again.
The Gulf War also revealed a central weakness in the 
position of the US. It may well be that there is no great 
power interested in pushing America off its perch. But the 
US is economically reliant on other great powers to stay 
there. The demands for economic contributions during the 
war against Iraq showed that the US does not have the 
domestic base to sustain its solitary superpower status. In 
fact, America's military machine is now being cut to the 
size of a declining national economy.
Perhaps America did win the Cold War, but it certainly 
exhausted itself in the process. The collapse of Soviet 
power and the fail ure of a new challenger to emerge, makes 
the US look much stronger than it actually is. Imagine if 
after World War Two the United States and the Soviet 
Union did not exist, leaving only Britain and Germany. 
Britain would still be exhausted by war, but the remnants 
of its former power would seem to be more important. 
Germany, by contrast, would be even more devastated — 
economically crushed and shattered as a unified nation­
state — because Britain couldn't afford to help her. This 
analogy, though flawed, captures an important truth about 
the current international situation.
Furthermore, if the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe con­
tinue to be dominated by old elites wearing 'new hats', the 
same is also true of the United States. The President is a 
former UN ambassador, envoy to China and directorof the 
CIA. He was Reagan's vice-president throughout Cold 
War H Those around him also have impeccable elite and 
Cold War credentials. Together, they run a Cold War 
military-industrial apparatus which not only remains in­
tact, but is searching for new missions to justify its exist­
ence. Drug traffickers and terrorists compete to be the new 
number one enemy, while the threat of an Islamic bomb is 
the latest justification for continuing with the expensive 
Star Wars program.
The continuous rule of Cold War elites in a post-Cold War 
era also has an ideological effect. Put bluntly, these rulers 
lack a strategic vision for the role of their nation in the new
international system. Gorbachev's blindness in this regard 
almost had fatal consequences for him personally. Bush's 
strategic myopia has resulted in disasters in Panama and 
the Middle East.
Bush's failure to define the exact meaning of his New 
World Order and how it might be implemented has been 
hidden by some great successes in the day-to-day manage­
ment of US foreign policy. But reactive political ad-hoc-ery 
cannot sustain New World Order Three. The US ad­
ministration palpably lacks the vision and the means to 
develop its version of the New World Order. It has simply 
provided the world with an empty phrase to cover its own 
lack of strategy in the post-Cold War era.
East European dem ocracy  
is a thin electoral veneer.
It has often been pointed out that one of the great ironies 
of this century has been that the Left has been 'nationalised' 
as capitalism becomes internationalised. European 
socialist parties, with the exception of the Italians, sup­
ported their nation-states in World War One. 'Socialism in 
One Country' became the motto of Eastern and Western 
communist parties. In the Third World, marxist-leninist 
organisations were, atbest, movements for national libera­
tion. Almost everywhere, social democracy and marxism- 
leninism became statist strategies for increasing power and 
wealth.
The collapse of the Bolshevik model means that one path 
of national development for the Left has been closed off. 
The current crisi s of sod al democracy (since the mid-1970s) 
shows that 'Social Democracy in One Country' isn't pos­
sible either Thus the Left must be de-nationalised and 
re-internationalised if it wants to solve its own problems 
and help resolve those of the world. The historic split of 
1917 is no longer relevant, and it is time to fundamentally 
re-examine these basic issues.
None of the three dominant world orders, as presently 
defined, will solve the problems of superpower decline 
and the eruption of regional conflicts. The four 'P s of 
poverty, patriarchy, pollution and proliferation also remain 
unaddressed by existing alternatives. This should not give 
us satisfaction, but instead spur our thoughts and our 
actions. One can only hope that a pluralistic and interna­
tional Left can meet the exciting challenges of this new 
post-Cold War world. If it doesn't, it will deserve its current 
media caricature as offering no concrete solutions to real 
and pressing global problems.
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